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 While communist countries generally banded together behind the Soviet Union (USSR, 
1917-1991) during the Cold War (1945-1991), the deteriorating relations between the USSR and 
People’s Republic of China (PRC, 1949-Present) caused a major shift within the communist 
international in the late 1950’s into the 1960’s. With the new leadership under Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971), the Soviet Union would try for a “Peaceful Coexistence” with 
the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949-present), with the 
concept being introduced in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU, Feb 14-25, 1956). The Soviet Union also was the de facto leader of the communist world 
and was rather coercive towards the rest of the communist world. These became major points of 
contention between the PRC and the Soviet Union. The USSR’s theory of Peaceful Coexistence 
directly opposed the hardline Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s idea of permanent revolution 
against the West. The plans for destalinization were also introduced at the Twentieth Congress, 
which directly conflicted with Chairman Mao Zedong’s (1893-1976) use of Stalinism and its 
associated usage of a cult of personality, terror, and propaganda. The Sino-Soviet Split was 
largely caused by differences in communist ideologies, Mao’s perception of Soviet paternalism, 
and the competition over power and influence. 
The idea of international communism being monolithic in the post-Second World War 
world is patently false. While the signs were not seen on the surface beforehand, after the 
protests in Poland and Hungary in 1956, non-Soviet communists were increasingly alienated.1 In 
Poland and Hungary, protests against the Soviet-aligned governments were suppressed harshly 
by Red Army forces, most memorably with a Soviet tank driving through a building in Budapest. 
In the CCP Politburo, there was a unanimous disapproval of how the Soviet Union had dealt with 
its Eastern European satellite states due to the fact that the Soviet Union saw its satellite states as 
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inferior. This is particularly problematic in Marxism because according to Marxism, all peoples 
must be treated as equal. While the CCP Politburo did not exactly approve of mass protest and 
resistance to communist governments, they disapproved more of Moscow’s “Big-power 
Chauvinism.”2 Moscow, in true Soviet fashion, cracked down hard on the protests in Hungary 
and Poland, with thousands killed and a dark stain on the Soviet Union’s reputation 
internationally. In the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish Revolutions (both 1956), the 
Premier and foreign minister of the PRC, Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), and the Premier of Poland, 
Józef Cyrankiewicz (1911-1989), both issued a communiqué from Beijing in January of 1957 
stating that “They [the communist world] should consistently combat all deviations, whether 
doctrinaire or revisionist.”3 
At the root of this split was destalinization. There were two major issues with this. First, 
Chairman Mao was not terribly far from being a full-blown Stalinist himself. He was a 
totalitarian leader who collectivized agriculture, though quite unsuccessfully, and created a cult 
of personality around himself. After Khrushchev denounced cult of personality as being against 
the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, Beijing and Moscow would start to see a clear divide between 
their ideologies, though it was not exactly a perfect relationship prior to destalinization. There 
existed an idea of Beijing being a second-class partner to the Soviet Union especially while the 
Soviet Union was under Joseph Stalin (1878-1953).4 This Soviet paternalism of socialist states is 
far from a new idea and can be seen in the Soviet response to the Revolutions in Hungary and 
Poland in 1956, and 1948 with the “suicide” of Jan Masaryk (1886-1948). Masaryk, the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in the immediate aftermath of the German Occupation, who was 
defenestrated, according to some, due to his anti-communist stances.5 Second, the Soviet Union 
had not consulted the CCP about their plans to completely discredit Josef Stalin, the former 
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General Secretary of the Soviet Union, and all the ramifications for the communist world that 
such an action would entail.6 This is also important because it has the CPSU as the de facto 
leader of the international communist movement. This move to not inform the CCP beforehand 
shows an idea of superiority to the rest of the communist world, which was quite off-putting in 
China, especially considering their history with the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949).  
An unlikely battleground in this dispute was Albania. In the 1950’s, in the wake of 
Stalin’s death, the Albanian Communist Party (1941-1991) under Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) was 
uneasy about Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia (1945-1992) under Marshal Josip Broz Tito 
(1892-1980) over the issue of national security. When the Soviet Union started a rapprochement 
with Marshal Tito in the mid-1950’s, Albania started looking for other allies, and in 1956, it 
found one in China.7 The alliance with China was twofold: They were far away enough from 
Albania as to not threaten their security but also were ideologically similar in their defense of 
Stalinism. After Stalin’s Death, there was a massive state funeral in Tirana, the capital of 
Albania, complete with bowing before Stalin’s statue and making an oath to follow Stalin.8 
Moscow did not, however, want to simply cut Albania loose. By the time that Sino-Albanian 
relations had grown stronger, in 1959, Khrushchev made a visit to Albania, according to the 
Soviets, to show that Moscow cared about Albania, but likely for other reasons, like to counter 
US missiles in Greece and Turkey or to grow agricultural products for the Soviet Union.9 In the 
aftermath of the split in 1960, Khrushchev tried to coerce Hoxha back into line by cutting grain 
supplies while Albania was experiencing a famine, only to have China come in soon after with 
wheat for Albania.10 This competition over allies further damaged the already strained relations 
between China and the Soviet Union. 
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The process of destalinization in the Soviet Union also had issues in the greater context 
of Marxist ideology. In Marxist thought, the party (in this case, the CPSU) is the direct voice and 
representative of the people and, therefore, could not be incorrect. Stalin was the head of the 
CPSU, and therefore, saying that he was incorrect in his methods was also saying that the CPSU 
was incorrect. This led to a Chinese view of Soviet revisionism of history against Stalin, and by 
extension, the concept of the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and the very concept of Marxism-
Leninism.11 Another result was the Soviet loss of prestige abroad. 
After the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), the Guomindang (1919-present), or the 
Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek (1887-1975) escaped to the island of Formosa to set 
up a government in exile, which became Taiwan. Both countries, to this day, claim the other to 
be an imposter and claim to be the rightful government of China. In 1958, Mao ordered the 
bombardment of two Nationalist-controlled islands just off the mainland in the Taiwan Strait, 
which nearly spiraled into a nuclear war with the United States. This occurred while Zhou Enlai 
was pushing for peace with the West, like the Soviet Union at the time.12 This decision by Mao 
was brash, but it showed Mao’s hardline nature against the Soviet doctrine of Peaceful 
Coexistence by directly and unabashedly attacking a US ally. In public, Mao also expressed no 
fear of war in any capacity. He stated in 1957 about the prospect of nuclear war: 
 
We shouldn’t be afraid of nuclear bombs and missiles. No matter what kind of 
war breaks out—conventional or thermonuclear—we’ll win. As for China, if the 
imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than three hundred million 
people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we’ll get to work 
producing more babies than ever before.13 
 
Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger (1923-present) stated 
that “Khrushchev was ‘deeply disturbed,’ and recalled the audience’s strained and nervous 
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laughter as Mao described nuclear Armageddon in whimsical and earthy language.”14 Of course, 
any reasonable person would be “deeply disturbed” after a power-mad autocrat offhandedly 
mentioned sacrificing half of his country’s population in a war with at least one, likely more, 
nuclear powers. 
The recent Chinese experience with foreign powers in the Century of Humiliation was 
also a subtle underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet Split. The “Century of Humiliation” is the term 
given to the 110-year period where China was constantly coerced by the major powers of the 
world into numerous uneven treaties, horrific wars, rebellions, and other foreign 
embarrassments. This period of time started in 1839 with the First Opium War (1839-1842) with 
the British Empire. As the name would imply, the war was over opium, which was Great 
Britain’s answer to a major trade imbalance between itself and China. Opium importation was 
shortly banned by the emperor, only to have the British then turn to smuggling.15 After a Chinese 
official destroyed the illegal Opium in Canton (present-day Guangzhou), things spiraled out of 
control and started the war.16 After the Chinese forces were swept aside by the modernized 
British forces, Hong Kong was taken by the British, and China was forced to accept British 
opium shipments. This and numerous other events, like the foreign intervention during the Boxer 
Rebellion and numerous other unequal treaties, lead to the Century of Humiliation, which in turn 
caused Chairman Mao to develop a victim complex. 
Mao famously stated, “When I say, ‘Learn from the Soviet Union,’ we don’t have to 
learn how to shit and piss from the Soviet Union, too, do we?”17 Soviet aid to China was 
considerable, with aid being in the form of low interest, high principle loans, specialists, and 
education of Chinese citizens in the Soviet Union.18 The Chinese had a major objection to this 
because of the Soviet emphasis on leading the communist world by force and punishing dissent 
  
Paul 6 
 
 
 
in other socialist countries. One way to look at the Soviet aid is to see it as foreign investment, or 
a form of imperialism, like in Budapest. Considering the lingering Chinese psyche from the 
Century of Humiliation, this was not terribly popular with the Chairman. In 1960, all Soviet 
specialists were withdrawn from China under orders from Khrushchev, leaving only a handful of 
Soviet citizens in the country, like diplomats and trade officials.19 Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
in 1958 wanted to create a joint Sino-Soviet Submarine force in the Pacific.20 The Soviet Union 
could have had several reasons for this move, but the two most important potential reasons here 
are the Soviet Union trying to exert its power over China, and that the Soviet Union was trying to 
promote unity between the Soviet Union and China. Mao believed the latter and furiously 
refused. 
This sense of inferiority and aid from the Soviet Union did, however, lead to one of the 
most disastrous decisions in modern history: The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962). The general 
plan was to make up for China’s lack of development with sheer numbers and mass mobilization 
of the 650 million Chinese citizens.21 One of the countless issues with the Great Leap Forward 
was Mao’s lack of any real firm plans for how to execute it, except to catch up to Great Britain in 
15 years. Other issues included the killing of sparrows that ate the seeds of crops on farms and 
having peasants making steel in homemade backyard blast furnaces.22 This is obviously a 
monumental task, considering the disparity of industrialization between China and Great Britain 
at this point in time. Great Britain in 1956 had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP, the total value 
of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year) of about $119 million when 
converted from GBP (British Pound) and adjusted for inflation.23 In the same year, the PRC had 
a GDP of $39.6 million, meaning that Mao was planning on more than doubling his economy in 
15 years, which is simply absurd.24 
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Mao’s trepidation of his heavy reliance on the Soviet Union’s material and intellectual 
aid was confirmed when, in 1957, the Soviet Union went back on the promise it had made to 
supply China with nuclear weaponry.25 The reasoning behind this is quite obvious: the rest of the 
world, especially the United States, would respond very negatively to a country giving a 
functioning nuclear weapon to another.26 Furthermore, this decision was made under 
Khrushchev’s idea of Peaceful Coexistence with the United States and NATO. This still did not 
go over well in Beijing, as one would imagine, and only helped to further the divide between the 
former allies. Much like Don Quijote de la Mancha jousting the windmills, Mao’s attempts to 
modernize China made sense to the Chairman, but not to those in the position of sitting by and 
being powerless against his delusions like Sancho.27 
Ultimately, the Sino-Soviet Split had, and still continues to have impacts on modern 
geopolitics. It also is an excellent case study of the internal politics, strife and bitter 
disagreements between the communist states, instead of the monolithic, international 
communism that the United States Government thought it was facing. This also says something 
about humanity. Communism, according to Marx, is supposed to be the final evolution of human 
society, but multiple wars including the use of nuclear weapons were very close to breaking out 
between the two largest communist countries due to nuanced ideas and pride.  
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